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For many years, the docket books kept by a number of the Hughes Court Justices have been held by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Yet the existence of these docket books was not widely known, and access to them was highly restricted. In April of 2014, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase access to the docket books for researchers. This article offers a report and analysis based on a review of all of the docket books that the Curator's Office holds for the early Hughes Court, comprising the 1929 Terms. Only one of the entries in these docket books has been examined and reported on before. Oil & Gas Co. 8 In addition, for these and the many other cases examined, this article also reports on whether a unanimous decision was also free from dissent at conference or became so only because one or more Justices acquiesced in the judgment of their colleagues, as well as on whether nonunanimous decisions were divided by the same vote and with the same alliances at conference. The docket books also provide records of instances in which a case that initially was assigned to one Justice was later reassigned to another. These records afford us some insight into the kinds of cases in which this tended to occur, and provide an opportunity to document for the first time the long held suspicion that the notoriously slowwriting Justice Van Devanter frequently was relieved of his opinions by the Chief Justice.
A review of the early Hughes Court docket books also makes possible two contributions to the political science literature on judicial behavior. The first is to the scholarship on vote fluidity and unanimity norms in the Supreme Court. It is widely agreed that the period from the Chief Justiceship of John Marshall through that of Charles Evans Hughes was characterized by a "norm of consensus," "marked by individual justices accepting the Court's majority opinions." 9 It is generally believed that this norm of consensus collapsed early in the Chief Justiceship of Harlan Fiske Stone, 10 though some scholars have pointed to causes that antedate Stone's elevation to the center chair. 11 Still others have suggested that there may have been "an earlier, more gradual change in norms" on the late Taft and Hughes Courts. 12 Political scientists who have had access to the docket books of various Justices serving on other Courts have demonstrated that much of the consensus achieved by the Court throughout its history has resulted from the decision of Justices who had dissented at conference to join the majority's ultimate disposition. A substantial body of literature shows that Justices commonly have changed their votes between the conference and the final vote on the merits. 13 Of the different types of vote fluidity between the conference vote and the final vote on the merits in major early Hughes Court cases, by far the most common was for a Justice to move from a dissenting or passing vote to a vote with the ultimate majority. An examination of the docket books permits us to illuminate several features of this phenomenon: the major cases in which it occurred, how frequently it occurred in major cases, the frequency with which each of the Justices did so, and the comparative success of early Hughes Court Justices in preparing majority opinions that would either enlarge By examining the docket books for the early Hughes Court (pictured in 1930 ), comprising the 1929 Terms, the author was able to report whether a unanimous decision was also free from dissent at conference or became so only because one or more Justices acquiesced in the judgment of their colleagues, as well as on whether non-unanimous decisions were divided by the same vote and with the same alliances at conference. The docket books also provide records of instances in which a case that initially was assigned to one Justice was later reassigned to another.
the size of the ultimate winning coalition or produce ultimate unanimity from a divided conference.
The second contribution concerns the behavior of newcomers to the Court. In 1958, Eloise C. Snyder published an article in which she concluded that new members of the Court tended initially to affiliate with a moderate, "pivotal clique" before migrating to a more clearly ideological liberal or conservative bloc.
14 Seven years later, J. Woodford
Howard argued that Justice Frank Murphy's first three Terms on the Court were marked by a "freshman effect" characterized by an "instability" in his decision making that rendered the Justice "diffident to the point
The Justices have traditionally used special docket books to record votes and take notes on case deliberations in Conference. Bound red-leather books embossed in gold with a hefty locket, such as this one belonging to Pierce Butler, came into use in the 1870s and were issued by the Government Printing Office until the 1940s.
of indecisiveness." 15 These studies in turn spawned a literature on the "freshman" or "acclimation" effect for Justices new to the Court. These studies generally characterize the freshman effect "as consisting of one or more of the following types of behavior:
(1) initial bewilderment or disorientation, (2) assignment of a lower than average number of opinions to the new justices, and (3) an initial tendency on the part of the new justice to join a moderate block of justices." 16 While some studies have confirmed the existence of some feature or another of the freshman effect, 17 others have cast significant doubt on the hypothesis, maintaining that it is either non-existent or confined to limited circumstances. 18 Studies of the freshman period for individual Justices on the whole have not lent much support to the hypothesis. 19 Professor Howard suggested that the freshman effect might also be manifested by a tendency of new Justices to change their votes between the conference vote and the final vote on the merits. Howard listed a number of considerations that might prompt a Justice to shift ground in this manner, but first among them were "unstable attitudes that seem to have resulted from the process of assimilation to the Court." For instance, he remarked, "Justice Cardozo, according to one clerk's recollection of the docket books . . . frequently vot[ed] alone in conference before ultimately submerging himself in a group opinion." 20 Howard reported that Justice
Murphy exhibited "a similar instability" during his freshman years on the Court.
21
Subsequent studies from the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Court docket books have produced divergent conclusions with respect to this reputed feature of the freshman effect.
22
The only freshman Justices on the early Hughes Court were Owen J. Roberts, appointed in 1930, and Benjamin N. Cardozo, appointed in 1932. 23 A review of the voting behavior of these newcomers to the Court does not disclose any appreciable freshman effect with respect to voting fluidity. Instead, one finds that, in the major cases examined here, these two Justices were among the least likely to change their positions between the conference vote and the final vote on the merits.
The Early Hughes Court Justices and Their Docket Books
The early Hughes Court was a remarkably stable Court. After Hughes was confirmed to the center chair on February 13, 1930, 24 In discussing the post-conference voting behaviors of the early Hughes Court Justices, I will be using several defined terms. I shall use the term acquiescence to denote instances in which a Justice who either dissented or passed at conference ultimately joined in the majority's disposition. 31 In other words, acquiescence denotes instances in which a Justice who was not with the majority at conference moved toward the majority. I will refer to movements from dissent at conference to the majority in the final vote on the merits 32 as instances of strong acquiescence, and to movements from a passing vote at conference to the majority in the final vote on the merits as instances of weak acquiescence. 33 Of course, such movement might have occurred either because the Justice in question became persuaded that the majority was correct, or because, though remaining unpersuaded, he elected to go along with the majority for the sake of some other consideration such as collegiality or public perception. 34 The information contained in the docket books does not enable us to discriminate between these two possibilities, and therefore I shall not attempt to do so here. I will use the term non-acquiescence to denote instances in which a Justice who dissented at conference remained steadfast in his opposition to the majority's disposition. In cases of non-acquiescence, there was no post-conference change in the vote of the Justice in question. I will use the term quasi-acquiescence to denote a situation in which a Justice who was inclined in conference to oppose the majority's disposition withheld his dissent and instead publicly concurred in the result with the written statement that he was doing so only because he felt bound by the authority of an earlier decision with which he disagreed. Finally, I will use the term defection to denote instances in which a Justice who was either a member of the conference majority or passed at conference later dissented from the published opinion. 35 In other words, defection denotes instances in which the Justice in question moved away from the majority. Again, I will refer to movements from the majority at conference to dissent in the final vote on the merits as instances of strong defection, and to movements from a passing vote at conference to the majority in the final vote on the merits as instances of weak defection.
36
The Cases Chief's theory of the case found expression in his opinion for the Court, which contains no reference to the doctrine of laches. There also were a number of cases concerning criminal law and criminal procedure in which the votes both at conference and in the published opinion were unanimous. 53 the famous case involving the trial of the "Scottsboro Boys," several young AfricanAmericans charged with raping two white girls on a train in Alabama. 94 There the Justices held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause entitled indigent defendants in a capital case to effective, court-appointed counsel. The trial judge had appointed the entire local bar rather than a specific attorney to represent the defendants, which resulted in a lawyer from outside the state with no criminal defense experience in Alabama representing the defendants. The majority held that this procedure was plainly inadequate. The vote both at conference and in the published decision was 7-2, with McReynolds and Butler dissenting. 95 Butler records that at the conference Hughes stated, "(a) 'Show of force,'" apparently referring to the large presence of intimidating local whites at the trial. Butler here interjects in brackets, apparently capturing his own thoughts that were not necessarily voiced, "But did not that make for a 'fair trial. involved land that the federal government had granted to the state of Oklahoma for the purpose of supporting common schools. The state in turn leased the land to the company for the purpose of extraction of oil and gas. A portion of the gross production from the site was reserved to the state, with the balance being sold by the company. The Court held that the company was an instrumentality of the state for purposes of generating revenue to support the public schools, and that the income from sales of the oil and gas produced at the site was constitutionally immune from federal taxation. In doing so, the majority felt bound by the precedent of Gillespie v. 177 Most of the reassignments that Hughes ordered during the early years of his tenure as Chief Justice thus resulted either from changes in the vote after the conference, or from Van Devanter's inability to produce an opinion in a case with which he had been entrusted.
Conclusion
In addition to the information that they provide about the Court's deliberations in particular cases, the docket books of the early Hughes Court Justices teach us some larger lessons. First, they confirm Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s claim that Hughes occasionally was obliged to relieve Van Devanter of his literary burdens, and they show that the few other instances in which Hughes reassigned cases typically involved a post-conference voting shift.
Second, the docket books teach us that McReynolds's published record in cases involving political economy would lead one to believe that he was more amenable to regulation and taxation than his conference conduct would indicate. Though he ultimately joined the majorities in Federal Trade Commission v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., United States v. Louisiana, Stephenson v. Binford, Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, and Educational Films Corp. v . Ward, he cast a dissenting vote in each of these cases at conference. In addition, though he ultimately voted to uphold government regulation in FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., at the conference vote he passed. The published decisions can also be misleading concerning McReynolds's views in cases involving civil rights and civil liberties. Though he ultimately joined majorities favoring such claims in many cases, at conference he passed in United States v. Lefkowitz and United States v. Murdock. And assuming that Butler's notes on the conference discussion in Nixon v. Condon faithfully record the Chief Justice's remarks, Hughes was less inclined to strong protections of voting rights than his vote in the published opinion would suggest.
The civil liberties views of Stone and Cardozo also are illuminated by the docket book records. These two Justices publicly dissented from a number of decisions reversing criminal convictions 178 -indeed, Stone complained that Butler was soft on crime 179 -but their conference votes reveal them to be even less favorably inclined toward claims of the accused than their published votes would suggest. Cardozo joined the majority in Gebardi v. United States, but at conference he had dissented. Stone ultimately joined the majorities in Sorrells v. United States and United States v. LaFranca, but at conference he passed in the former and dissented in the latter. And, though Stone ultimately joined the dissenters in United States v. Bland, at the conference he voted with the majority. The docket books also reveal considerable fluidity between the initial conference vote and the final vote on the merits among the Justices of the early Hughes Court. First, there were nine instances of defection in major cases. Stone was responsible for six of these, departing from a conference vote with the majority in Bland and Crowell, and from a passing conference vote in Sorrells, Liggett, Rock Island, and Liebmann, though Butler's conference notes indicate that Stone was already inclined to join Brandeis in his Liebmann dissent. Holmes departed from a passing conference vote in Rock Island, Brandeis ultimately abandoned his vote with the Sorrells conference majority, and Roberts joined in Stone's defection from the Crowell conference majority. Thus, four of these defections were of the strong variety, and five of the weak variety. Second, there also were shifts in voting that created majorities where none had formed at the conference. Hughes was responsible for two such instances, shifting his vote to form new 5-4 majorities for positions that he had initially opposed in conference in Nixon v. Condon and Burnet. Similarly, Roberts shifted his initial conference vote in Limehouse in order to transform a 4-4 deadlock into a majority for affirmance. Third, though Holmes voted with the dissenters at the Indian Motorcycle conference, he ultimately adhered to his custom of quasi-acquiescence.
The most common form of vote fluidity on the early Hughes Court, however, was acquiescence. Of the thirty-four unanimous decisions discussed here, twenty-one (61.8%) also were unanimous at conference, but thirteen (38.2%) were not. This observation is consistent with earlier studies finding that conformity voting is the most common form of vote fluidity. 180 The frequency with which each of the Justices acquiesced in the views of the majority is worthy of note. The notoriously cantankerous and disagreeable Justice McReynolds was actually the member of the Court most likely to acquiesce in a decision in order to produce unanimity. Of the thirteen unanimous decisions examined here that were not unanimous at conference, McReynolds acquiesced in seven (53.8%). By contrast, Sutherland did so in three (23.1%), Brandeis and Stone in two (15.4%) each, and Holmes, Van Devanter, Butler, and Cardozo in one (7.7%) each. Of these eighteen instances of acquiescence, eleven were of the strong variety, six of the weak variety, and the character of the last cannot be determined with confidence.
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With respect to cases that did not produce unanimity, McReynolds and Brandeis each acquiesced in three, while Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler, and Cardozo each acquiesced in one. Of these ten instances of acquiescence, eight were of the strong variety, and two were of the weak sort.
182 Thus, of these twenty-eight instances of acquiescence in major cases decided by the early Hughes Court, nineteen were of the strong variety, eight of the weak variety, and the character of one cannot be determined with confidence. The fact that two of the most senior Justices-McReynolds and Brandeis-were those who most frequently acquiesced in the conference majority's judgment in major cases also indicates that newcomers to the early Hughes Court did not experience the kind of freshman effect with respect to voting fluidity that some scholars have found on other Courts. Indeed, the only Justices to acquiesce in fewer major cases than Cardozo were Hughes and Roberts, and Roberts acquiesced in none. Moreover, both Roberts and Cardozo would continue to acquiesce in major cases at comparable or higher rates later into their tenures on the Court. 185 This finding would appear to be in tension with Paul Freund's recollection that Cardozo often changed his vote between the conference vote and the final vote on the merits during the 1932 Term. However, Freund reported that, "As far as I could make out, [Cardozo's] disagreements [with the majority in conference]-this being his first full term on the Court-derived from the fact that in New York he had been accustomed to a rather different set of procedural rules and substantive rules intermeshed with procedure, so that some things which were decided one way in the federal courts would have been decided differently in New York," and that this is what may have accounted for the Justice's allegedly frequent changes of vote between the conference and the final vote on the merits. 186 This suggests the possibility that Cardozo may have exhibited greater freshman vote fluidity in less salient cases not examined here. 187 The Justices of the early Hughes Court, seven of whom were holdovers from the Taft Court, thus carried forward the practices so carefully cultivated by Hughes's predecessor as Chief Justice. Taft is famous for his "consuming ambition" to "mass the Court"-to build unanimity so as to give "weight and solidity" to its decisions. 188 The Taft 193 Van Devanter shared Taft's distaste for public displays of discord, and strongly lobbied his colleagues to suppress their dissenting views. 194 Butler similarly regarded dissents as exercises of "vanity" that "seldom aid us in the right development or statement of the law," and instead "often do harm." McReynolds and Sutherland expressed similar views, and suppressed dissenting opinions accordingly. 197 Even the "great dissenters,"
Holmes and Brandeis, believed that dissents should be aired sparingly, and often "shut up," as Holmes liked to put it, when their views departed from those of their colleagues.
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Like Taft, Hughes "sought to present a united Court to the public," 199 frequently suppressing his own views for the sake of unanimity. As he wrote on his return of one of Stone's draft opinions, "I choke a little at swallowing your analysis, still I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to expose my views." 200 In his efforts "to find common ground upon which all could stand," Hughes "was willing to modify his own opinions to hold or increase his majority; and if this meant he had to put in some disconnected thoughts or sentences, in they went. REV. 1891 REV. (1994 . Scholars may differ concerning the inclusion or exclusion of particular cases from this category, and the statistical discussion in the Conclusion must be read with that caveat in mind.
The Judges' Bill and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 471, 481 (1977) (arguing that the enactment of the Judges' bill of 1925, which made the Court's docket almost entirely discretionary, increased the proportion of cases that were legally or politically salient and thus less likely to elicit acquiescence from colleagues inclined to disagree with the majority), with Walker, Epstein, & Dixon, 50 JOURNAL OF POLITICS at 365-66 (agreeing that "it is possible that a discretionary docket may be one factor, and a necessary one at that, in maintaining high levels of conflict once such patterns are established," but disputing the contention that the 1925 statute was "the primary factor in the alteration of the Court's consensus norms," pointing out that "significant escalation in both the dissent and concurrence rates did not occur until almost fifteen years" after the dramatic increase in the discretionary share of the Court's docket); accord, 225, 227 (1965) ("I was struck in the 1932 Term with the number of occasions on which what came down as unanimous opinions had been far from that at conference. I had access to the docket book which the Justice kept as a record of the conference vote-these books are destroyed at the end of each term-and I was enormously impressed with how many divisions there were that did not show up in the final vote. I was impressed with how often Justice Cardozo was in a minority, often of one, at conference, but did not press his position.") 21 REV. at 589 (finding that "freshmen justices are significantly more likely to switch than are their more senior colleagues"), Saul Brenner, Another Look at Freshman Indecisiveness on the United States Supreme Court, 16 POLITY 320 (1983) (finding that between the 1946 and 1966 Terms freshman Justices exhibited on average greater fluidity between the conference vote and the final vote on the merits than did senior Justices, and that this fluidity tended to diminish between a Justice's first and fourth Terms on the Court), and Dorff & Brenner, 54 J. POLITICS at 767, (finding that freshman Justices were "more likely to be uncertain regarding how to vote at the original vote on the merits and more likely to be influenced by the decision of the majority at the final vote") with D. 241, 347 (1988) . 30 With the exception of the Van Devanter OT 1931 Docket Book, which was donated to the Curator's office in the 1990s by a descendant of a former law clerk, each of these docket books remained in the Supreme Court building after the respective Justice either retired or died while in office. It is not known why these volumes were retained, nor why not all of the sets of docket books are complete. In 1972 all of the "historic" docket books held in the Supreme Court building were boxed up by the Court's Marshal at the order of Chief Justice Warren Burger, and were later transferred to the Curator's Office. Email communication from Matthew Hofstedt, Associate Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, August 26, 2014. 31 This is also sometimes referred to as "conformity fluidity); Brenner, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. at 389 (finding that 68% of the cases in which there was vote fluidity resulted in an increase in the size of the majority); Brenner, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. at 531, 534 ("justices are more likely to switch from the minority or nonparticipation at the original vote to the majority position at the final vote than to shift in the opposite direction . . . Clearly, some of the justices, once they have lost at the original vote or failed to participate in that vote, are willing to conform to the opinion of the court's majority and vote with them at the final vote. Indeed, over threequarters of the vote changes moved in a consensus direction.") 181 Four of McReynolds's seven acquiescences in ultimately unanimous case were strong (Keppel Bros., Fox Film, U.S. v. Louisiana, Alford), while three were weak (Cahoon, Algoma Lumber, Lefkowitz). Of Sutherland's three such acquiescences, at least two (Fox Film, U.S. v. Louisiana) were strong, while his acquiescence in Blasius may have been either strong or weak, depending upon which docket book one consults. Brandeis's acquiescence in U.S. v. Louisiana was technically weak, though Butler's conference notes suggest that he was initially inclined to dissent. The docket books also suggest that his acquiescence in LaFranca was of the strong variety. Stone strongly acquiesced in LaFranca but only weakly in Worthen. POLITY 157, 163 (1989) . An examination of these cases also provides some indication of the comparative success of the Justices in preparing opinions that would attract colleagues who had dissented or passed at conference. There were thirteen major cases that became unanimous after a divided conference vote. Hughes (Cahoon, Blasius, Worthen, Doyal) and Stone (Keppel Bros., U.S. v. Louisiana, Alford, Gebardi) each accounted for 30.7% of these cases. Butler (Petersen
